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Europe and Overseas Commodity
Traders v. Banque Paribas London:
Zero Steps Forward and Two Steps
Back
ABSTRACT

While internationalsecurities transactionshave become
the norm in today's globalized economy, such transactions
necessarily implicate the laws of more than one nation,
thereby creating both conflict and confusion. Due to the depth
and breadth of U.S. securities laws, plaintiffs often prefer to
sue in the United States under U.S. law. Yet inappropriately
applying U.S. law to transnationaltransactionsmay offend
notions of comity. This Note discusses the different tools
used to decide the following jurisdictional issues. First,
under what circumstances do U.S. anti-fraud rules apply to
securities transactions? Second, under what circumstances
do U.S. registrationlaws apply? Over the past two decades,
the judicially created "conduct" and 'effects" tests used to
decide whether U.S. anti-fraud laws apply have produced
inconsistent results and have created uncertainty and
unpredictabilityfor both investors and issuers. Conversely,
Regulation S, used to determine whether U.S. registration
laws apply, was designed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to promote predictability and clarity.
While commentators have recommended revising the conduct
and effects tests to more closely resemble the bright line of
Regulation S, the Second Circuit did the reverse in 1998. In
Europe and Overseas Commodities Traders, S.A. v. Banque
Paribas London (EOC), the Second Circuit essentially revised
Regulation S to more closely resemble the conduct and effects
tests. This Note begins with an historical analysis of the
United States securities laws and the effect of globalization
on these laws. It then analyzes the issues and holding of
EOC and the SEC's response. Finally, it evaluates the
weakness of the Second Circuit's decision and predicts its
internationalramifications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While transnational flows of capital are not an entirely new
phenomenon,' at the time that the United States enacted its
securities laws in the early 1930s securities transactions were
primarily domestic. 2 The intense trend toward globalization in
the past decade and the sharp upswing in transnational
securities transactions3 may require reconsideration of those
laws. As cross-border transactions have become the norm rather
than the exception, foreign and domestic issuers and investors
have been left wondering: When are offerings and sales of foreign
securities in the United States subject to U.S. registration
provisions? What is the extraterritorial scope of U.S. enforcement
and antifraud protection?
Due to the strengths of U.S. securities regulation-its
extensive liability standards, its competent and knowledgeable
federal judiciaries, and its powerful tools for the enforcement of
judgments-foreign victims of securities violations are tempted to
seek recovery in the United States, rather than in their own
countries. 4 In addition to overburdening U.S. courts, however,

1.
See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1201 n. 1 (2d ed. 1997)
(noting that "most of the capital used to fund last century's railroad expansion in
the United States came from bonds floated in Europe").
2.
See Samuel Wolff, Offshore Distributions under the Securities Act of
1933: An Analysis of Regulation S, 23 LAw & POLY INT'L Bus. 101, 109 (19911992).
3.
In 1980, American investors purchased $17.9 billion of foreign
securities, while in 1994, American investors purchased more than $850 billion in
foreign securities. See Christopher J. Mailander, Searchingfor Liquidity: United
States Exit Strategiesfor InternationalPrivateEquity Investment, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 71, 72 n.2 (1997) (citing J. Carter Beese, Jr., Reengineering Regulation:
Maintaining the Competitiveness of the United States Capital Markets, 18 WASH. L.
Q. 133 (1995) available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File.). Yearly gross
trading in foreign stocks by U.S. investors increased from $30.4 billion in the mid1980s to almost $560 billion in 1993. See Todd Cohen, The Regulation of Foreign
Securities: A Proposal To Amend the Reconciliation Requirement and Increase The
Strength of Domestic Markets, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 491 (1995). Foreign
purchases of U.S. debt securities increased from $122.9 billion in 1980 to
approximately $3.9 trillion in 1990, a 3073% growth. See Kelly Y. Testy, Comity
and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REv.
927, 930 & n. 14 (1994) (citing Reauthorizationsfor the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 1992-1994: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14
(1991)).
4.
See, e.g., Testy, supra note 3, at 957 (explaining that "since the U.S.
securities laws are commonly accorded respect as the most stringent in the world,
often the application of such laws will give investors a windfall in the form of more
protection than that for which they actually bargained").
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this raises serious concerns of regulatory arbitrage, lack of
comity, and disrespect for the sovereignty of other nations. 5
Securities regulation requires a careful balance of investor
protection and market efficiency. 6
The responsibility for
assessing such concerns should not be a judicial one. 7
Yet,
because the text of U.S.
securities laws provides little
jurisdictional guidance and few, if any, jurisdictional limits,
courts have often been left to balance these issues case by case. 8
The tests for jurisdiction over transnational antifraud casesthe "conduct" test and the 'effects"
test-were judicially
constructed. 9
The conduct test scrutinizes the nature of the
defendant's conduct in the United States and its relation to the
alleged fraudulent securities transaction.' 0
The effects test
examines the effects of a fraudulent transaction on American
investors or on the U.S. securities markets."
Over the past two
decades, these tests have produced inconsistent results and
created uncertainty and unpredictability for investors and
issuers.
How much conduct and of what type is required to
satisfy the conduct test? How much effect? The answers to these
questions vary from Circuit to Circuit and from year to year.
Conversely, jurisdiction over registration claims is regulated
through a test specifically designed by the Securities and

5.
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation
of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 523, 570-71 (1993) (citing objection
and retaliation by other countries against aggressive application of U.S. law).
6.
See Testy, supra note 3, at 954-55 (discussing the need to reconcile
equity and efficiency).
7.
See, for example, Fisch, supra note 5, at 566, stating
It is difficult for the courts to analyze and weigh the interests of the United
States in applying its laws to an international securities transaction. It is
even more difficult for the courts to determine the interests of the foreign
sovereign and to balance those interests against the interests of the United
States as required.
8.
See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Kerman,
468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1968), rev'd with respect to holding on merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
9.
See Bersch, 519 F.2d 974; ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir.
1975); Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326.
10.
For cases construing the conduct test, see lIT v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909
(2d Cir. 1980); Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001; Bersch, 519 F.2d 974; Leasco, 468 F.2d
1326.
11.
For cases construing the effects test, see ConsolidatedGold Fields PLC
v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989), modified by 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989); Bersch, 519 F.2d 974; Schoenbaum,
405 F.2d 200.
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Exchange Commission (SEC).12 With Regulation S, the SEC
announced a detailed and carefully constructed limit to the
3
extraterritorial application of U.S. registration requirements.'
The regulation reconciles the conflicting goals of investor
protection with the need for an efficient system of international
securities regulation. 14 It is specifically designed for predictability
and clarity.
Commentators have expressed the need for Congress to
outline a more appropriate and clear scope for the antifraud
provisions.' 5 Specifically, it has been suggested that Congress
look to Regulation S as a guide.' 6 In 1998, however, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, referred to as the
"Mother Court" 17 and "de facto Supreme Court"' 8 of securities
regulation, stood this recommendation on its head, foregoing the
bright-line text of Regulation S in favor of the heavily fact- and
judgment-based conduct and effects analyses. 19
This Note suggests that the Second Circuit took no steps
forward and two steps back when it decided Europe and Overseas
Commodity Traders,S.A. v. Banque ParibasLondon (EOO). Part II
of the Note provides an historical analysis of U.S. securities laws
and the effect of globalization on those laws. Part III analyzes the
issues and holding of EOC and considers the brief submitted by
the SEC as amicus curiae for the EOC case. Finally, Part IV
evaluates the weaknesses of the Second Circuit's decision and
predicts its international ramifications.

12.
See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33, 6863,
[1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,524 (Apr. 24, 1990)
[hereinafter Release No. 68631.
13.
See id.
14.
See, e.g., Wolff, supranote 2, at 101.
15.
See Testy, supra note 3, at 929 (suggesting that "the time is ripe for
either Congress or the SEC to meaningfully grapple with this issue and provide
the judiciary with guidance").
16.
See id.
17.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds,
Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 413 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 115 & n.29
(3d Cir. 1977).
18.
Jan G. Deutch, Chiarella v. United States: A Study in Legal Style, 58
TEX. L. REv. 1291, 1299 (1980); cf. Conference on Codjifcation of the Federal
Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 900 (1967) (comments of Judge Friendly)
(noting that 'I suppose there is some sort of conclusive presumption that judges of
the Second Circuit where so much securities litigation is centered must know
something about the securities laws.").
19.
See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas
London, 147 F.3d 118, 125-28 (2d Cir. 1998).
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II. GLOBALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS

A. Trends
While historically American investors have shown little
interest in foreign securities, 20 within the past ten years
investment capital has moved beyond U.S. boundaries at
unprecedented rates. 2 1
In 1990, the large growth in U.S.
investments in foreign securities was led primarily by
institutional investors seeking higher rates of return as a result of
low interest rates and slow corporate earnings growth in the
United States. 22
Additionally, individual investors began to
recognize that they could lower investment portfolio risk by
diversifying holdings to include foreign stock. 23
Fiber optics,
satellites, and advances in telecommunications allowed money to
move instantaneously from country to country, 24 making the
world a smaller place in which to conduct business. Investors
worldwide could easily and quickly purchase and sell securities in
25
various national markets.
The rush to foreign markets is illustrated by the following: in
the mid-1980s, U.S. investors purchased $2 billion of foreign
securities per year, whereas in the third quarter of 1993, they
26
bought $2 billion of foreign securities per week.
Despite the obvious hunger and market for foreign securities,
many foreign companies that are eligible to list securities on the
New York Stock Exchange remain unlisted. 2 7 Several reasons
account for this reluctance. First, foreign companies, whose own
accounting principles, registration, and disclosure practices differ
markedly from those that apply to U.S. issuers, often shy away

20.
See Mailander, supranote 3, at 72-73 (reviewing U.S. Treasury Bulletin
statistics on total U.S. purchases and sales of securities in foreign markets).
21.
See id.
22.
See Testy, supra note 3, at 930.
23.
See Mailander, supra note 3, at 74 & n.12 (citing and quoting Jim
Cochrane, Senior Vice President for Research and Planning of the New York Stock
Exchange, as stating that "American investors have discovered that by not having
foreign securities in their portfolios for the last, say, 15 to 20 years, they have left
money on the table. If they had diversified, they would have enjoyed high rates of
return at low risk-an example of pure economic gain.").
24.
See James J. Finnerty III, The 'Mother Court" and the Foreign Plaintiff.
Does Rule lOb-5ReachFarEnoughP,61 FoRDHAM L. REv. S-287, S-288 (1993).
25.
See id.
26.
See Cohen, supra note 3, at 491.
27.
See id. at 493.
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from the strict regulations of the United States.2 8 Second, the
United States has paired this extensive system of regulation with
a liberal enforcement policy. 29 Commentators note that litigation
in the United States "tends to be more intrusive, more time30
consuming, and more costly than litigation in other countries."
Issuers may also fear that any negative information divulged
in the U.S. market 3 l will find its way from the United States to
the issuer's home market, where it otherwise would have
remained hidden. 3 2 For example, German companies for years
refused to submit to U.S. securities laws, unwilling to forgo the
use of German accounting practices that permitted companies to
increase profits on paper by using hidden reserves 3 3 to take
advantage of the depth, breadth, and liquidity of the U.S.
markets. 3 4 For example in 1993, Daimler-Benz became the first
German company to list on the New York Stock Exchange. 3 5 As
required under U.S. law, Daimler-Benz agreed to publicly disclose
for the first time hidden reserves maintained on its balance sheet.
When it recalculated its 1993 earnings according to U.S.

28.
See generally, Mailander, supra note 3, at 87-88. The standard
registration forms for the "foreign private issuer" include Forms F-1, F-2, or F-3.
Form F-1 is a long-form registration statement filed by foreign issuers prior to
making a public offering in the United States. Id. at 87-88.
The most difficult F-1 disclosures for a foreign issuer relate to the financial
statements. Issuers are required to provide audited, consolidated balance
sheets for the issuer covering the last two years, as well as audited
statements of income and cash flows for each of the issuer's three most
recent fiscal years.
Id. at 88. These statements must be in accordance with either United States
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) or the accounting principles
of the issuer's home country (so long as the issuer also supplies corresponding
reconciliation of such statements to GAAP). See id.
29.
See Margaret V. Sachs, The InternationalReach of Rule IOb-5: The Myth
of CongressionalSilence, 28 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 678 & n.53 (1990).
30.
Fisch, supra note 5, at 531.
31.
Form F-1 requires the issuer to provide a description of the company,
the nature of its business, its holdings, the existence of material legal proceedings,
a discussion of the risk factors related to the securities, information about the
shareholders in the company seeking to sell securities in the offering, the intended
use of the offering proceeds, and other financial information. See Mailander,
supra note 3, at 88.
32.
See Cohen, supranote 3, at 494.
33.
That is, funds were tucked away during good years in order to smooth
out or paper over losses during bad years. See id. at 495. This is an unacceptable
practice under U.S. GAAP.
34.
See LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES
REGULATION 689 (4th ed. 1999).

35.

See Cohen, supranote 3, at 494.
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accounting standards, Daimler's profit of $97 million became a
36
loss of $548 million.
Alongside the development of a global capital market,
therefore, has come conflict, as multinational securities deals
have implicated the laws and interests of more than one sovereign
nation.3 7 The United States views its jurisdiction expansively,
often imposing its regulations on transactions that are essentially
foreign.3 8 As the United States has become more militant in
applying its laws to international securities transactions, other
countries have objected.3 9 Some countries have retaliated by
passing legislation designed to protect domestic transactions
while discriminating against U.S. businesses. 4°
Additionally,
some countries have enacted rules aimed at preventing the
41
encroachment of the U.S. litigation process.
Regulation of foreign securities transactions, thus, requires a
careful balance of competing risks. While too little protection
increases investment risks for Americans, too much protection
reduces investment opportunity, as countries opt out of U.S.
business for fear of invoking its stringent regulations.
B. U.S. Securities Laws
While around-the-clock trading venues and instantaneous
multinational communications suggest that capital markets know
no national boundaries, regulation of those markets does remain
national. 42 The primary U.S. statutes governing the offer, sale,
and trading of securities are the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). The
difficulty with both Acts is that at the time Congress enacted
them, relatively few international securities transactions were

36.
See id.
37.
See, e.g., Fisch, supranote 5, at 570-71; Testy, supranote 3, at 954.
38.
See Fisch, supranote 5, at 570.
39.
See, e.g., Warren Pengilley, ExtraterritorialityEffects of United States
Commercial and Antitrust Legislation: A View from "Down Under," 16 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 833, 835-36 (1983) (describing "furor" in the international
community over broad application of U.S. jurisdiction).
40.
For instance, in response to aggressive extraterritorial application of
U.S. statutes by American courts, Great Britain passed the Protection of Trading
Interests Act in 1980. See Gregory K. Matson, Note, Restricting the Jurisdictionof
American Courts Over TransnationalSecurities Fraud, 79 GEO. L.J. 141, 166-67
(1990). This act allowed the Minister of Foreign Trade to authorize citizens to
disobey the law of other nations when that law is applied extraterritorially. See id.
41.
For instance, "blocking statutes" prohibit documents that are
connected with foreign litigation from being disclosed or removed from the
enacting country.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES § 442 cmt. 4 (1987).
42.
See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supranote 34, at 688.
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taking place. 4 3 The statutes' effect on global markets was
unknown, and some say unconsidered, 4 4 at the time of their
creation. What is the limit of U.S. power under international law
to regulate conduct occurring primarily beyond its borders?
When must foreign issuers and investors comply with the
requirements of U.S. securities laws? Nothing in the language of
10b-5, 4 5 the primary antifraud provision of the Exchange Act, or

§ 5,4 6 the registration provision of the 1933 Act, specifically
defines or limits extraterritorial application. Instead, each statute
links federal jurisdiction to the use of interstate commerce. 47
"Interstate commerce" is defined to include "trade or
commerce in securities or any transportation or communication
relating thereto ...

between any foreign country and any State,

Territory, or the District of Columbia."48 The potential breadth of
this provision is vast. Even a telephone call or letter from a
foreign seller to a foreign investor who happens to be in the
United States could implicate U.S. securities laws.49 While the
broad reach of U.S. securities laws has been criticized both within
43.
See Wolff, supranote 2, at 109 & n.46.
44.
See i. at 108 (characterizing the effect of the statutes on transnational
securities transactions as insignificant in 1933).
45.
See discussion infra Part II.B. 1.
46.
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
47.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Section 5
states, "Unless a registration statement is in effect.., it shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly . . . to make use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell
such security through the use . . . of any prospectus or otherwise." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e(a)(1) (1994). Section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to issue rules making it
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange... [t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
48.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1994).
49.
See, e.g., Doll v. James Martin Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 510, 520 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (in securities cases "the transmission of the letter to Ann Arbor [from
Bermuda] was in and of itself a sufficient act to create subject matter
jurisdiction"); SEC v. Capital Growth Co., S.A., 391 F. Supp. 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (making telephone calls and sending mail to the U.S. may be "conduct"
within the U.S. for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction under the federal
securities laws). Additionally, "[p]resumably everybody would agree that the
making of an offer from another country into the United States by mail or
telephone is subject to [Sections] 5 and 17(a) [of the Securities Act] even though
neither the seller nor an agent of the seller sets foot in the United States." FED.
SECURITIES CODE § 1905 cmt. 3(b) (American Law Institute 1980).
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the United States and abroad5s as a form of legal and economic
"imperialism,"s l neither Congress nor the SEC has allayed these
concerns or provided guidance to courts.5 2 Courts, for the most
part, continue to decide jurisdictional
issues based upon their
53
own discretion, case by case.
The Second Circuit's Judge Friendly once stated:
We freely acknowledge that if we were asked to point to language in
the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these
conclusions, we would be unable to respond. The Congress that
passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in the midst of the
depression could hardly have been expected to foresee the
development of ... thirty years later ....
Our conclusions rest on
case law and commentary concerning the application of the
securities laws and other statutes to situations with foreign
elements and on our best judgment as to what Congress would
54
have wished if these problems had occurred to it.

1. Scope of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's Antifraud
Provisions
When considering the jurisdictional reach of U.S. antifraud
rules, courts face a dilemma. On the one hand, U.S. securities
laws were designed to protect U.S. investors and the integrity of
the U.S. securities markets.5s Exonerating issuers who violate
those regulations simply because the transaction has foreign
components undermines this policy. On the other hand, the
United States is not the lone sovereign of the world. It is in our
national interest to honor foreign sovereignty and to support
international comity. Inviting foreign securities litigants to the
United States presumes common goals and imposes U.S. policy
choices on other nations. Compelling other nations to accept the
50.
See generally Fisch, supra note 5 (discussing the broad reach of U.S.
regulation and proposing a legislative approach based upon choice-of-law issues);
Donald H. J. Hermann, ExtraterritorialCriminal Jurisdiction in Securities Law
Regulation, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 207 (1985-86) (rejecting adoption of the proposed
Federal Securities Code in favor of the revised RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW that limits the applicability of the conduct and effects tests); Grunenthal
Gmbh v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (applying the analysis set forth
in §§ 17 and 18 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES).
51.
See Peter Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws-Banking Law of the
World?, 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 39, 40 (1978).
52.
See Testy, supra note 3, at 958 (arguing that Congress should provide
clear legislative guidelines, rather than continue to allow courts to regulate in on
"ad hoc judicial decision making basis").
53.
See id.
54.
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
55.
See generally Cohen, supra note 3, at 496-500.
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policy choices of the United States fosters international discord
and uncertainty. It may also unduly discourage foreign persons
from engaging in securities-related behavior with U.S. persons or
within the United States.
Choosing to err on the side of investor protection, however,
federal courts have applied the antifraud provisions liberally.
Without Congressional guidance concerning the scope of the
antifraud provisions, the Second Circuit pioneered-and has
since been the leader-in prescribing the limits of U.S.
jurisdiction over transnational securities transactions.5 6 While
Congress did not provide express guidance on the extraterritorial
application of the antifraud provisions, the Second Circuit felt
Congress would not have wanted the United States to become a
base for fraudulent conduct that was harmful to foreign
investors.5 7 Further, the Second Circuit believed Congress would
have wanted to remedy harms having a substantial effect on
investors within the United States, even if those harms had been
perpetrated abroad. 5 8
To decide whether U.S. courts would have jurisdiction over
fraud cases, two general tests, the conduct test and the effects
test, evolved. 5 9 Historically, these two tests have been phrased as
alternative tests. That is, if either test is satisfied, U.S. courts will
60
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the transaction.
The effects test was first articulated in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, in which the issue was whether to apply the Exchange
Act's antifraud provisions to a fraudulent sale of stock involving
two foreign corporations. 6 1
In Schoenbaum, an American
shareholder in Banff Oil, Ltd., a Canadian corporation that traded

56.

In the field of securities law, the Second Circuit has been deemed the

"Mother Court." See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762
(1975) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
57.
See, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir.

1983).
58.
See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd
with respect to holding on merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
59.
See generally Bersch, 519 F.2d 974; Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Kerman, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001
(2d Cir. 1975).
60.
In 1995, the Second Circuit combined the tests, deciding that there
was "no requirement that [the] two tests be applied separately and distinctly from
each other. Indeed, an admixture or combination of the two often gives a better
picture of whether there is sufficient United States involvement to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by an American Court." Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54
F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1044 (1996). Under the
"admixture" test, while neither "conduct" nor "effects" individually are sufficient to
confer jurisdiction, the two tests combined may be. See id.
61.
405 F.2d at 204.
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on the American Stock Exchange, brought a derivative suit
alleging damages from a fraudulent sale of Banff treasury stock to
two foreign companies, Aquitane of Canada, Ltd. and Paribas
Corporation. 6 2
The Second Circuit conferred jurisdiction,
reasoning that the transaction could have adversely affected
American investors since the stock was traded on an American
stock exchange. 63
The Schoenbaum case thus marked an
adoption of the effects test-a general economic effect on a U.S.
securities market will suffice to permit jurisdiction
of a U.S. court
64
over a transnational securities transaction.
The conduct test surfaced in Leasco Data ProcessingEquip.
Corp. v. Maxwell. 65 Because the issuer in Leasco was not listed
on an American stock exchange, the jurisdictional issue was more
difficult.6 6

In this case, Maxwell, an owner of the British

corporation Pergamon Press, allegedly induced, through
misrepresentation of financial performance, an American
corporation (Leasco) to purchase Pergamon's stock at a price
exceeding its actual value. 67 While the actual stock purchase
occurred on the London Stock Exchange, some negotiations and
misrepresentations occurred within the United States. 68 The
jurisdictional issue was thus directed at somewhat remote effects
and remote activity
occurring, for the most part, outside the
69
United States.
While the Second Circuit ultimately conferred jurisdiction
over Leasco's claim, it declined to do so under the effects test,
even though the American plaintiff suffered a large financial

62.
The plaintiff alleged that Banff's directors and the officers of Aquitane
and Paribas conspired to defraud Banff by selling treasury shares at a price below
its actual value. See id. at 205-06.
63.
See id. at 208. The court reasoned that the fraudulent sale of Banff's
stock would reduce Banff's shareholders' equity. See id. This, in turn, the court
explained, would decrease Banff's common stock share prices on the American
Stock Exchange. See id. at 208-09.
64.
Id. at 206. The court explained that Congress intended the Exchange
Act's antifraud provisions to protect "domestic investors who have purchased
foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities
market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities."
The court ultimately dismissed the Rule 10b-5 claim for failure to state a cause of
action, since plaintiff's complaint included allegations of breach of fiduciary duty
and not fraud. See id. at 209.
65.
Leasco Data Processing Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972).
66.
See id. at 1340.
67.
See id. at 1330.
68.
See id. at 1332.
69.
See id. at 1334.
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loss. 70
Instead, jurisdiction was conferred on the basis of
Maxwell's conduct, that is, the "substantial misrepresentations"
he made in the United States. 7 1 Although a foreign company had
arranged the fraud, and although the victim was a foreign
subsidiary of an American corporation, jurisdiction was granted.
This second test-the conduct test-states that the Exchange Act
applies to securities transactions conducted abroad in which a
foreign defendant has engaged in some conduct in the United
States related to the fraudulent securities transaction. 7 2 The
Second Circuit felt that Congress would have "wished to protect
an American investor if a foreigner comes to the United States
and fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities
abroad."7 3
Three years after Leasco, the Second Circuit decided Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone Inc. (Bersch).7 4 In Bersch, an American citizen
brought a class action suit 75 against a Canadian corporation
(IOS), alleging that it had issued a misleading prospectus during
its public offering of an offshore mutual fund. 7 6 The plaintiffs
further alleged that American defendants had assisted IOS within
the United States with the offering and with the drafting of the
77
prospectus.
Plaintiffs argued that IOS had caused adverse economic
effects on U.S. securities markets and on American investors
such that U.S. jurisdiction was warranted. 78
Narrowing

70.
See id. at 1334. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend for
the antifraud provisions to apply in situations "fw]hen no fraud has been practiced
in this country and the purchase or sale has not been made here." Id.
71.
Id. at 1337.
72.
See id. at 1334-35.
73.
Id. While the actual stock purchase took place in London and involved
securities not traded on a U.S. exchange, according to the court, Maxwell's
meetings with Leasco and his letters and telephone calls to Leasco "whetted
Leasco's interest in acquiring Pergamon," and therefore was an "essential link' in
inducing Leasco to purchase the stock. Id. at 1335.
74.
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
75.
The class consisted of U.S. citizens residing in the United States, U.S.
citizens residing abroad, and foreign citizens who had purchased IOS stock
outside the U.S. See id. at 993-98.
76.
See id. at 981.
77.
See id.
78.
See id. at 987-90. The "effects" claimed by plaintiffs were extensive.
See id. at 987-88. The plaintiffs' expert stated that the collapse of IOS resulted in
a deterioration of both domestic and foreign investor confidence. See id. This
deterioration, it was argued, caused a "steep decline" in foreign purchases of U.S.
securities. Id. (quoting plaintiffs expert). This decline then led to a redemption of
mutual fund shares, causing a ripple effect that depressed the prices of American
securities. See id. at 988. Finally, it was argued that the IOS collapse destroyed
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Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit concluded that the effects test
permitted jurisdiction over fraudulent transnational securities
transactions "only when [the transaction] result[s] in injury to
purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom the United
States has an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse
effect on the American economy or American investors
79
generally."
Having declined jurisdiction under the effects test, the court
next considered the defendants' conduct 0 in the United States.
The Second Circuit concluded that while most of the conduct in
the United States was "merely preparatory" to the actual fraud,
when the defendant mailed the misleading prospectuses from
abroad to U.S. citizens in the United States, it nevertheless
subjected itself to U.S. jurisdiction. 8 ' Thus, while under Leasco
"some" conduct in the United States was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction, the court in Bersch made it clear that "merely
preparatory" conduct was not sufficient.8 2
"While merely
preparatory activities in the United States are not enough to
trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners
located abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to
Americans so resident."8 3 Jurisdiction was conferred only for the
84
U.S. citizens residing within the United States.
Since deciding this trilogy of cases, the Second Circuit has
refined and amended the conduct and effects tests. In !!T v.
Vencap, Ltd., 85 decided on the same day as Bersch, the Second
Circuit held that jurisdiction existed over a Bahamian corporation

an offshore investing industry in which European investors "were channeled into
American securities markets." Id. (quoting plaintiffs' expert).
79.
Id. at 989.
80.
The defendants had held numerous meetings in New York in which the
deal was initiated, organized, and structured.
See id. at 985 n.24. The
defendants discussed the deal with the SEC and retained lawyers and
accountants to review IOS operations and to prepare reports. See id. Defendants
drafted part of the prospectus in New York and showed the completed draft in New
York to potential secondary underwriters. Finally, the defendants opened bank
accounts in New York. See id.
81.
Id. at 991.
82.
Id. at 992.
83.
Id.
84.
The Second Circuit thus set forth the following three-pronged conduct
test based on the effect felt in the United States: (1) no conduct is necessary for a
U.S. citizen, (2) some material conduct is necessary for a U.S. citizen residing
abroad, and (3) much conduct is necessary for foreign citizens. See id. at 993.
85.
lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). In Vencap, the
Second Circuit established jurisdiction over a Bahamian corporation alleged to
have defrauded a Luxembourg investment trust when the acts that consummated
the fraud-use of defendant's attorney's office in the United States to maintain
records and solicit foreign clients--occurred within the United States. See id. at
1018.
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alleged to have defrauded a Luxembourg investment trust. 8 6
While the court found the extent of American holdings in the
trust insufficient to support jurisdiction under the effects test, it
reasoned that jurisdiction nonetheless existed if conduct of a
sufficient "wickedness . . . [was] engineered from the United
States." 87
The court concluded that defendant's use of his
attorney's office as a "base" from which to solicit foreign clients
and to maintain records of transactions was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. 88
In 1IT v. Comfeld,8 9 the Second Circuit expanded and thereby
complicated the conduct test. In deciding whether conduct was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction, the court performed a balancing
test, weighing the amount of conduct that occurred in the United
States against the amount of conduct that occurred offshore. 90
The court stated that a court's "[d]etermination of whether
American activities 'directly' caused losses to foreigners depends
not only on how much was done in the United States but also on
how much (here how little) was done abroad."9 1

86.
See id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
In conferring jurisdiction in Vencap, the court broadened its
approach. No longer concerned merely with U.S. investor protection, the court
suggested an additional concern-the reputation of the American securities
markets. The court adopted this approach "to protect the integrity of American
securities markets from reputational inroads." SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra
note 34, at 711. In so doing, the court also denied a new Congressional purpose
for U.S. securities laws:
We do not think that Congress intended to allow the United States to be
used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export,
even when these are peddled only to foreigners.... [T]he position we are
taking here itself extends the application of the securities laws to
transnational transactions beyond prior decisions and the line has to be
drawn somewhere if the securities laws are not to apply in every instance
where something has happened in the United States, however large the gap
between the something and a consummated fraud and however negligible
the effect in the United States or its citizens.
Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1017-18.
89.
IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). In Cornfeld, the plaintiff
(lIT) was a Luxembourg trust fund holding a portfolio of securities investments in
which several thousand fundholders participated. Id. at 913. Before IIT entered
bankruptcy under Luxembourg law, two Americans, including Cornfeld, controlled
the fund through a series of offshore shell corporations organized in Luxembourg,
Panama, and Canada. These companies were operated from Switzerland. Id. The
challenged transactions involved three IIT securities purchases of several
companies owned by a third American, Kind, who offered investments in natural
resource tax shelters. IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 211-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
rev'd and remanded, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
90.
See Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 920.
91.
Id. at 920-21.
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Finally, in Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC,9 2 the court for the first
time combined the conduct and effects test. In Itoba, a foreign
company, ADT, was allegedly defrauded in purchasing Lep's stock
on the London Stock Exchange. 9 3 This purchase was made
partly in reliance on Lep's required SEC filings. 9 4 ADT's stock
was traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and half of its
shareholders of record were residents of the United States. 95 The
loss complained of, however, was the loss in value of the stock
bought in London. 96 The court found that, while a large number
of ADT's shareholders were American, and although its stock was
traded on the New York Stock Exchange, Itoba was a foreign
company. 97 Under Schoenbaun, there was an insufficient effect
98
in the United States to justify the assertion of jurisdiction.
Additionally, the court declined to confer jurisdiction on conduct
alone. 9 9 Nevertheless, the court then combined the conduct and
effects tests, 0°' and using this "admixture" test, the Second
Circuit conferred subject matter jurisdiction.1 0 1 In other words,
while there was insufficient connection to qualify under either the
effects test or the conduct test alone, the two tests together
provided sufficient U.S. connection to justify jurisdiction.
While the conduct and effects tests were designed to provide
concrete jurisdictional guidance to courts, courts have varied
wildly in applying these tests. While the Second Circuit applies
the tests narrowly, other Circuits are far more liberal. Outside
the Second Circuit, for instance, jurisdiction has been granted
based solely on a phone call, mail coming into the United States
from abroad, 0 2 or a single meeting in the United States between
03
foreigners.1

92.
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. CT. 702 (1996).
93.
See id. at 121.
94.
See id.
95.
See id. at 120.
96.
See id. at 121.
97.
See id. at 120.
98.
See id. at 124.
99.
See id.
100. See id. at 122. The court stated that "[tihere is no requirement that
these two tests be applied separately and distinctly from each other. Indeed, and
admixture or combination of the two often gives a better picture of whether there
is sufficient United States involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an
American court." Id. at 122.
101. See id at 124.
102. See, e.g., Continental Grain (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.,
592 F.2d 409, 420 n.18 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that for the purpose of subject
matter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws, "[b]oth the place of sending
and the place of receipt constitute locations in which conduct takes place when
the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce are use[d] .... "); Doll v.
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2. Scope of the Securities Act of 1933s Registration Provision
Congress passed the registration provisions of the 1933 Act
"to assure full and fair disclosure in connection with the public
distribution of securities."1 0 4 Through mandatory disclosure,
Congress sought to promote informed investing and to deter the
kind of fraudulent conduct that was believed to have led to the
market collapse of 1929.105 Unless a registration statement has
been filed with the SEC, § 5 makes it unlawful to "make use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security."1 0 6 As
with Rule 10b-5, 1 0 7 since virtually no offering can escape
"interstate commerce," § 5 could be construed to apply to
securities transactions having only trivial connections to the
United States.1 0 8
Under this broad reading of § 5, issuers must
comply both with the 1933 Act's registration requirements and
with foreign securities laws, even when no U.S. purchasers are
involved.
As under Rule lOb-5, the following questions come to mind
with respect to § 5: What is the limit of U.S. power under
international law to regulate conduct occurring primarily beyond
its borders? When must foreign issuers and investors comply
with the registration requirements of U.S. securities laws? The
answers are not always easy. While the SEC gave courts the
discretion to limit 10b-5's jurisdictional reach, the SEC restricted
judicial discretion under § 5. In view of the potential reach of § 5
and of the increasing importance of international securities
offerings, the SEC acted affirmatively to limit its scope.
In 1964, the SEC issued Securities Act Release Number 4708
(Release 4708), designed to govern and clarify the scope of § 5 in
relation to offshore transactions. 109 In that release, the SEC

James Martin Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 510, 520 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (stating that in
securities cases "the transmission of the letter to Ann Arbor [from Bermuda] was
in and of itself a sufficient act to create subject matter jurisdiction. . . ."); SEC v.
Capital Growth Co., 391 F. Supp. 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (stating that "making
telephone calls and sending mail to the United States" may be deemed conduct
within the United States for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction under the
federal securities laws).
103.
See, e.g., Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 420.
104.
COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 45.
105.
See id. at 14.
106.
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1)(a) (1998).
107.
See discussion supranotes 45-49 and accompanying text.
108.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
109. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act
Release No. 4708 [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1361-1363
(July 9, 1964).
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declared that it would take no enforcement action for failure to
register securities distributed abroad solely to foreign nationals if
the distribution was effected in a manner that would result in the
securities "coming to rest abroad." 1 10 Unfortunately, because the
SEC neglected to define "coming to rest abroad," Release 4708 set
an imprecise standard and resolved little. To determine whether
securities fit Release 4708, many companies were forced to seek
individualized determinations by the SEC that their particular
offerings did not fall within § 5's scope.' 1 1
This process
increased, rather than decreased, burdens for companies wishing
to accomplish offshore transactions.
As offshore securities transactions became more common,
and in order to achieve "a truly global market system," 1 12 the SEC
adopted Regulation S on April 24, 1990.113 Regulation S was
designed both to "clarify the extraterritorial application of the
registration requirements" of the 1933 Act 1 4 and to address the
SEC's principal fear-that unregistered securities sold abroad
would flow back to the United States, leaving U.S. investors
unprotected. 1 15 An important SEC stipulation with regard to
Regulation S is that it "relates solely to the applicability of the

110. Id.
111.
See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 No-Act
LEXIS 1870 (Feb. 21, 1985); Raymond Intl, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL
12937 (May 28, 1976).
112. Policy Statement on Regulation of International Securities Markets,
Securities Act Release No. 6807, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,963 (Nov. 21, 1988). Other
internationalization initiatives include (1) Rule 144A, which is designed to provide
institutional investors a liquid market for securities issued in exempt offerings
(including Regulation S offshore distributions), see generally Private Resales of
Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. Section 230.144A (1993); (2) Rule 15a-6, a
limited exemption for foreign broker-dealers transacting business with United
States institutional investors, see Registration Requirements for Foreign BrokerDealers, Exchange Act Release No. 27017, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,013 (July 11, 1989);
and (3) a multi-jurisdictional disclosure system (MJDS) between the United States
and Canada, see Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6841
to the Current Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, (July 24,
1989) (proposal); Multi-jurisdictional Securities Disclosure and Modifications,
Securities Act Release No. 6879, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,288 (Oct. 22, 1990) (re-proposal).
113.
See Release No. 68563, supra note 12. In this release, the SEC stated
that
reliance upon Securities Act Release No. 4708 and the no-action and
interpretative letters relating thereto is not appropriate for offerings of
securities commencing after the ninetieth day following publication of this
release in the Federal Register. Offers and sale previously made in reliance
upon no-action or interpretative letters are not adversely affected by the
adoption of Regulation S.
Id. at 80,662.
114. Id.
115. Id.

80,665.
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registration requirements of § 5 of the 1933 Act, and does not
limit the scope or extraterritorial application of the antifraud or
other provisions of the federal securities laws." 116
The SEC
thereby
distinguished
the
extraterritorial
scope
of U.S.
registration provisions that it was willing to delineate from the
extraterritorial scope of U.S. antifraud provisions that it was not
willing to delineate.117
Rule 901 of Regulation S provides that "the terms offer, offer
to sell, sell, sale and offer to buy shall be deemed to include offers
and sales that occur within the United States and shall be
deemed not to include offers and sales that occur outside the
United States." 118
Regulation S thereby codified the SEC's
position that registration was required only for securities
transactions "within the United States"-a territorial principle.
This territorial approach was important since it allowed investors,
in choosing their investment market, to also choose the laws and
9
regulations that they must follow."
In addition to the general statement of Rule 901, Regulation
S also provides two safe harbors for offshore transactions deemed
to be "outside the United States." Essentially, these safe harbors
enable some issuers to escape legal repercussions when they sell
securities offshore without U.S. registration.12 0
By fulfilling
certain conditions, the sale is considered to be "outside of the
United States," and, thus, exempt from burdensome U.S.
registration requirements.' 2 1 The requirements to satisfy either
safe harbor, contained in Rules 903 and 904,122 reflect
Congress's primary fear that offers of unregistered securities
might flow back to the United States, thereby leaving U.S.
investors unprotected. Both rules include conditions to prevent
unregistered, nonexempt offerings 12 3 from flowing into U.S.

116. Id. 80,665.
117. See Joel P. Trachtman, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-U.S. Securities
Laws-Applicability of Antifraud Provisions to Wholly Foreign Transaction,84 AM.
J. INT' L. 755, 756 (1990).
118. Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (1993).
119. Release No. 6863, supra note 12, at 80,665 (stating that "[a]s investors
choose their markets, they choose the laws and regulations applicable in such
markets*).
120.
See Julie L. Kaplan, "Pushingthe Envelope" of the Regulation S Safe
Harbors,44 AM. U.L. REV. 2495, 2497 (1995).
121.
See id.
122. Commodities and Securities Exchange, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903-.904
(1999).
123. An important means of accomplishing the objectives of U.S. securities
laws is through registration of securities. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note
34, at 3-4. Registration provides disclosure of material facts about the issuing
company and about the securities themselves and helps to prevent fraud or
misrepresentation in securities sales. See id. Generally, these registration
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markets. 124 If the conditions of either safe harbor are met, the
transaction is considered "outside the United States," and thus,
beyond the reach of § 5.125

To satisfy either safe harbor, the offer (1) must be made in an

"offshore transaction," 12 6 and (2) may not involve a "directed
selling effort" in the United States. 127 In addition to these two
basic conditions, issuer offerings must satisfy additional flowback
safeguards 128 that vary according to the kind of issuer and the
type of securities. "Offshore transaction" is defined as one in
which no offer is made to a "person in the United States," 12 9 and

the sale is accomplished in one of the following ways: (1) the
buyer must be outside the United States at the time the buy order
is originated; or (2) the transaction must be executed on any
established foreign securities exchange; 1 30 or (3) the sale must be
executed on a designated offshore securities market and the
transaction must not be prearranged with a buyer in the United
13 1
States.
To determine whether a transaction is "offshore," one must
first know whether an offer has been made to a "person in the
United States." Are transients "person[s] in the United States"?
What if the "transient" is merely on vacation in the United States?
What if the "transient" spends three months out of every year in
the United States? Six months? The SEC has specifically stated
that "offers and sales to transients in the United States are
transactions in the United States and may not be part of an
offering relying on the safe harbors of Regulation S. "132 Yet until

requirements apply to both U.S. and foreign securities sold in U.S markets. See
id. at 4. There are, however, certain exemptions. See id. For instance, registration
is not required for private offerings to a small number of persons who already have
access to the type of information a registration statement would disclose. See id.
at 4-5. Rules 903 and 904 are not concerned with these "exempt" transactions.
See Commodities and Securities Exchange, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903-.904 (1999).
Rather, they are concerned with those securities that are neither registered nor
exempt from registration. Id.
124.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903-.904.
125.
Id.
126.
17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a)(1).
127.
17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a)(2).
128.
In other words, these safeguards are designed to assure that the
securities will "come to rest" outside of the United States, and that they do not
somehow "trickle back" in. SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supranote 34, at 691-93.
129.
17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h)(1)(i) (1993).
130.
See Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h(1)(ii)(B)(1). However,
.offers and sales of securities specifically targeted at identifiable groups of U.S.
citizens abroad, such as members of the U.S. armed forces serving overseas, shall
not be deemed to be made in 'offshore transactions." 17 C.F.R. § 930.902(h)(2).
131.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h)(1)(ii)(B)(2). A designated offshore securities
market is defined in Rule 902(b)(2). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(b)(2).
132.
Release No. 6863, supra note 12, at 80,676 n.115.
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June 4, 1998, there was neither a case nor an SEC decision
construing Regulation S with respect to "transients." On June 4,
1998, the Second Circuit 133 decided Europe and Overseas
Commodity Traders S.A. v. Banque ParibasLondoni 3 (EOq. In
EOC, the court held that a series of fraudulent telephone calls
and faxes from a foreign company to a foreign national
temporarily living in Florida (i.e., a "transient") were insufficient to
invoke jurisdiction over the transactions under either U.S.
antifraud laws or U.S. registration laws. 135
Thus, the court
decided for the first time that a "transient" was not a "person in
13 6
the United States."
While the EOC decision alone is significant, it was the
manner in which the court reached this decision that will prove
far more consequential.
In its decision, the Second Circuit
proposed for the first time that courts deciding the extraterritorial
scope of U.S. registration laws may apply the same conduct and
effects tests historically reserved for fraud issues.1 3 7
In so
holding, the Second Circuit pushed aside the carefully tailored
provisions of Regulation S and obliterated Congress's efforts to
provide clear guidelines separate and distinct from the antifraud
provisions.

III. EUROPEAND OVERSEAS COMMODITY TRADERS, S.A. V. BANK PARIBAS
LONDON (EOq

A. Influence of the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit is recognized as the leading commercial
court in the United States, the "de facto Supreme Court", 138 and
the "Mother Court"13 9 of securities laws. The Second Circuit
derived these titles from the fact that it hears appeals from the

133.
See discussion infra Part III.A. regarding the importance of the Second
Circuit in securities law.
134. Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas
London, 147 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1998).
135.
See id. at 126-27.
136.
Id. at 124-25.
137.
See id. at 125.
138.
See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
139.
See, e.g., Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762
(1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty Ltd. v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 413 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109,
115 n.29 (3d Cir. 1977).
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1
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 40
which encompasses New York City-domicile of both the New
York and American Stock Exchanges and financial center of the
nation. 14 1
Thus, the Second Circuit has drawn a disproportionate share of the country's major securities litigation. From
1961 to 1997, the number of opinions from the Second Circuit
1 42
was nearly five times the average of the other federal courts.
Thus, any opinion produced by the Second Circuit presumably
carries great weight.

B.

Facts ofEOC

In EOC the Second Circuit dismissed, for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs claims seeking recovery under
the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the registration provisions
of the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940.14
Plaintiff Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A., a
Bahamian corporation whose sole business was the investment of
its capital in securities and other ventures, was wholly owned by
Alan Carr, a citizen of Canada. 1 4
Defendants were Banque
Paribas (Paribas), Paribas Global Bond Futures Fund, S.A.
(Fund), Paribas Asset Management, Ltd. (PAM), and John Arida, a
U.K. national who worked as an account manager in the London
office of Paribas. 145 Paribas was a French bank, the Fund was
organized under the laws of Luxembourg, and PAM was a
Bahamian corporation that managed the Fund.146 No U.S. party
was involved.
EOC established a securities trading account with Paribas in
London in October 1992.147 While Carr was visiting England in
October 1993, Arida approached Carr and proposed an
investment opportunity. 148
Carr expressed interest in the

140.
See Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities
Regulation: The Creation ofa JudicialReputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777, 791 (1997).
141.
See id.
142.
See id. at 793. Up to 70% of the U.S. Courts of Appeals opinions
considered to be principal cases in securities regulation casebooks have come
from the Second Circuit. See id.
143.
See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribus
London, 147 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1998).
144. See id. at 120.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147.
See id. at 121.
148.
See id.
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proposal, placed an initial purchase of shares in the Fund, 14 9 and
explained that since he was preparing to leave for his vacation
home in Florida in two days, he would like to hear more about the

proposal once he arrived in Florida.' 5 0 After Carr's arrival in
Florida, a series of telephone conversations took place between
Carr and Arida regarding the investment proposal.' s ' Carr, on
plaintiffs behalf, made seven purchases (six of which took place
from Florida) of shares in the Fund totaling approximately
Carr alleges that
$1,800,000152 (EOC-Paribas transactions).
during the course of solicitation-both before and after the initial
purchase in London-Arida made various misrepresentations
regarding the nature of the Fund.' 5 3 The value of the Fund
declined in the months that followed plaintiff's purchases.' 5 4 As
a result of the decline in the Fund's value, plaintiff claimed a loss
of $1,000,000.155 Plaintiff then initiated an action in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York against the
defendants.
C. The Issues
The issues at the heart of EOC were: (1) Do
misrepresentations by a foreign investment company to a nonU.S. citizen on U.S. soil violate the antifraud provisions of the
1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act?;' 5 6 and (2) Does the
sale of unregistered securities of an unregistered investment
company to a non-U.S. citizen on U.S. soil violate § 5 of the 1933
Act?' 5 7 The Second Circuit concluded that the5 8EOC-Paribas
transactions did not implicate U.S. securities laws.'
1. Do Misrepresentations by a Foreign Investment Company to a
Non-U.S. Citizen on U.S. Soil Violate the Antifraud Provisions of

the Securities Exchange Act?
As expected, in deciding this issue the Second Circuit applied
the conduct and effects tests. Under the effects test, the court

149. See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas
London, 940 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
150. See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, 147 F.3d at 121.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders,940 F. Supp. at 532-33.
154. See id. at 533.
155. See id. at 533.
156. See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, 147 F.3d at 123-27.
157. See id. at 127-31.
158. See id. at 127, 131.
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concluded that the U.S. interest affected by the transaction was
"indiscernible."' 5 9
First, the plaintiff was a Bahamian
corporation, and the individual who placed the purchase orders
and suffered the losses was a Canadian citizen.' 6 0 Second, the
securities were not traded on a U.S. exchange.' 6 1 Third, there
was no effect on an U.S.-affiliated company.1 6 2 In essence, the
court concluded that there was no jurisdiction under the effects
test because there was no involvement of a U.S. entity
that
16 3
Congress would have wanted to protect from swindlers.
Under the conduct test, the court concluded that Arida's
communications to Carr in Florida were insufficient to implicate
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.'" The court
reasoned that Carr's presence in the United States was
"fortuitous," and that the "actual" purchaser was Carr's
corporation, which did not have a place of business in the United
States.' 6 5 While recognizing that "Congress would not want the
United States to become a base for fraudulent activity harming
foreign investors," 166 the court believed it would be inconsistent
with the law to accept jurisdiction over this particular dispute
since the surrounding circumstances showed no relevant U.S.
interest. 167

2. Does the Sale of Unregistered Securities to a Non-U.S. Citizen
on U.S. Soil Violate § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933?
In deciding this issue, the Second Circuit recognized that, in
contrast to the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, the SEC
had provided guidance, by way of Regulation S, on the
applicability of the registration provisions to foreign
transactions.16 8
The court further noted that it "would be
violating legislative supremacy by failing to defer to the
interpretation of an agency to the extent that the agency had been
delegated law-making authority." 169 Under Regulation S, the
court noted, there were two ways the sale could have fallen
outside the scope of § 5. First, the transaction could have been

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 128.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 125.
See id. at 128-29.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 125.
See id. at 130-31.
See id. at 123.
Id. at 124 n.3.
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"outside the United States," 170 and second, it could have fallen
into one of the two safe harbors defined by Regulation S. 171 The
court found that the EOC-Paribas transactions did not meet
To begin, the court found that the
either safe harbor. 172
representations Arida made by telephone and facsimile to Carr in
Florida could qualify as either a "directed selling effort" or an offer
to a person in the United States. 17 3 Additionally, the court stated
that while Carr was acting merely as an agent of a foreign
corporation, Carr could be viewed as a person in the United
States for purposes of the safe harbors. 174 Thus, if one were to
look only at the safe harbors, the securities were required to have
been registered.
However, a transaction may fall outside both safe harbors
and yet still fit Rule 901 of Regulation S. That is, the EOCParibas transactions could still be "outside of the United States"
for purposes of Rule 901, and thus, the securities would not need
to be registered. 17 While the SEC had stated that "offers and
sales to transients in the United States are transactions in the
United States and may not be part of an offering relying on the
safe harbors of Regulation S,"176 at the time ROC was decided,
there had been no case law construing Rule 901 with respect to
transients visiting the United States. 177 To determine whether
the EOC-Paribas transactions were "outside the United States,"
and thereby outside the scope of § 5's registration provisions, the
178
court applied the conduct and effects tests.

Thus, for the first time, a court used the tests specifically
tailored for the antifraud provisions to analyze what was "outside
the United States" under Regulation S.179 The court concluded
that the "nearly de minimis" U.S. interest in the transaction

170. The SEC has indicated that for a transaction to qualify under the
General Statement of Regulation S-that is, that it has taken place "outside the
United States"-both the sale and the offer pursuant to which it was made must
be outside the United States. See Release No. 6863, supranote 12, at 80,663.
171.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903-.904.
172.
See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas
London, 147 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that "we cannot say definitively
... that such an agent can never qualify as a 'person in the U.S.' for the purposes

of the safe harbors.*).
173. Significantly, the court cites SEC Release No. 6863, stating that "offers
and sales to transients in the United States are transactions in the United States
and may not be part of an offering relying on the safe harbors of Regulation S."
Release No. 6863, supranote 12, at 80,676 n.115.
174. See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, 147 F.3d at 123-27.
175. Id. at 125.
176. Release No. 6863, supranote 12, at 80,676 n. 115.
177. See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, 147 F.3d at 12S.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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presented in EOC precluded a finding that U.S. jurisdiction
existed under the conduct and effects tests.1 8 0 Carr's presence in
the United States, the court reasoned, was "entirely fortuitous;"
Arida "did nothing to encourage a market for securities in the
United States;" and "the conduct was not such as to have the
effect of creating a market for those securities in the United
States."' 8 ' Plaintiffs complaint was thus dismissed for lack of
82
subject matter jurisdiction.1
D. SEC's Reaction to EOC
In response to a request from the Second Circuit, the SEC
submitted a brief as amicus curiae to discuss the jurisdictional
issues raised in the appeal of EOC.'8 3 In the brief, the SEC
disapproved of the decision to dismiss plaintiffs claims.
1. Antifraud Provision
The SEC believed the "substantial effects" that the
misrepresentations had on the plaintiff while in the United States
satisfied the effects test. The SEC chose, however, to focus its
argument to the Second Circuit on the conduct test.' 8 4 The SEC
argued that the conduct test was designed not only to protect
foreigners residing outside the United States from acts occurring
within the United States, but also to protect persons in the United
States from fraudulent representations transmitted into this
country from abroad.' 8 5
Stating that the focus of the conduct
test is the location of the fraudulent conduct that caused the
victim's loss, the SEC argued that the district court failed in two
ways to correctly apply this test.186 First, the district court
concluded that the defendants' activities in the United States (the
six actual purchases) were "outweighed by the acts that were
done abroad" (the account opening in London and the original
purchase in London).' 8 7 The SEC argued that because the court
failed to view each of the six U.S. purchases as separate

180.
Id. at 126-27.
181.
Id. at 127.
182.
See id. at 132.
183.
Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae,
Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque ParibasLondon, 147
F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1998) (No. 96-7900) [hereinafter SEC Briefi.
184.
See id. at 8-9.
185.

See id. at 9.

186.
187.

See id. at 12.
Id. at 11.

2000]

ZERO STEPS FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK

transactions, the court was wrong in its balancing test.1 8 8 Each
transaction occurred in the United States, and during each
transaction, misrepresentations were made.' 8 9 One transaction
that happened to take place in London should not negate six
transactions that took place in the United States. 190
Second, the SEC argued that the district court failed to focus
on the specific conduct that constituted the violation. 19 1 While
jurisdiction is not extended for conduct that is merely
preparatory, 192 in EOC the conduct that occurred in the United
States was precisely the fraudulent conduct plaintiff alleged to
have been the cause of loss. The SEC maintained that the court
was "[standing] Bersch on its head,"19 when it viewed the
"preparatory" conduct abroad (opening an account in London and
an
initial
purchase)
as
more
significant
than
the
19 4
misrepresentations themselves.
Finally, the SEC claimed that there had been no cases in
which a court had failed to find jurisdiction when the
misrepresentations that induced a plaintiff's losses were
transmitted into the United States. 19 s The fact that Carr was
living in the United States only temporarily was irrelevant. In
fact, the SEC argued, courts that had faced the issue of visitors
who purchase securities while in the United States had rejected
the idea that a plaintiff's temporary status in the United States
should preclude jurisdiction under the conduct analysis. 19 6 This
is particularly true when, as in EOC, the plaintiff lived in the
United States on a yearly basis for an extended duration. 19 7 To
deny the protection of U.S. securities laws in such circumstances
would create a misconception in those who expect to be protected
by such laws but are not. 198 A territorial approach, the SEC
argued, is appropriate since it produces a relatively bright line
and diminishes uncertainty. 19 9

188.
See id. at 12.
189.
See id.
190.
See id.
191.
See id.
192.
See id. at 12 (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987
(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975)).
193.
Id. at 13.
194.
Id.
195.
See id.at 14.
196.
See id. at 15-16 (citing AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership,
740 F.2d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 1984); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 426
(9th Cir. 1983)).
197.
See id. at 17-18.
198.
See id. at 18.
199.
See id.
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2. Registration Provision
Regulation S provides that § 5 applies to "offers and sales
that occur within the United States," 20 0 and that an offer "would
not be deemed to be outside the United States if made to a person
inside the United States . . . by a telephone call soliciting a
purchase in the United States or written material offering a
security being mailed or delivered to a person in the United
States."20 1 Thus, the SEC argued that Rule 901 should not apply
in EOC.
Additionally, the SEC argued that the EOC-Paribas
transactions failed both safe harbors. 20 2 The SEC asserted that
an offer made to a person in the United States includes offers
20 3
made to "transient visitors" not resident in the United States.
Since an "offshore" transaction is defined as an offer to sell
securities that "is not made to a person in the United States,"
Carr's purchase did not qualify, as he was in the United States at
2°4
the time the offer was made.
In adopting Regulation S, the SEC tried to avoid uncertainty
by drawing a "clear line." 20 5 That line, the SEC reasoned, was
most effectively drawn at the territorial boundaries of the United
States, since those who are offered securities while they are in the
United States may tend to purchase those securities with the
expectation that they are offered in compliance with the
protections afforded under U.S. law. 206
Thus, the SEC
concluded, denying jurisdiction in EOC conflicted with the
purposes of Regulation S.

IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S MISTAKE

A. The Significance ofEOC
While the EOC decision itself is significant and the court
arguably reached the "correct" outcome, the manner in which the
court reached its decision is troublesome. In EOC, the leading

200.
201.
Securities
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Release No. 6863, supranote 12, at 80,661.
SEC Brief, supra note 183, at 20 (citing Offshore Offers and Sales,
Act Release No. 6779 (June 10, 1988)).
See id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
See id.
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and most influential Circuit regarding securities law proposed for
the first time that the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities
registration laws should be determined through application of the
conduct and effects tests traditionally reserved for securities
fraud claims. 20 7 Over the past two decades, these tests have
produced inconsistent results and have created unpredictability.
In deciding EOC, the court ignored the advice of those who have
recommended the abandonment of these tests in favor of more
predictable guidelines, such as those in Regulation S. Worse still,
by using the conduct and effects tests as loopholes, the court
carelessly unraveled the SEC's craftsmanship of Regulation S.
B. Regulation S and the Conduct and Effects Tests Are Not
Interchangeable
In creating Regulation S, the SEC recognized that the
increasingly transnational character of securities markets
required a well-delineated, bright-line standard for determining
the reach of U.S. registration laws. 20 8 After years of confusion
over the applicability of U.S. registration laws to transnational
securities transactions, the SEC tried to provide predictability to
both issuers and investors. In designing Regulation S, therefore,
the SEC drew a clear line between those transactions that were
subject to the registration provisions and those that were not.
That line was represented by the territorial boundaries of the
2 9
United States. 0
Regulation S "relates solely to the applicability of the
registration requirements of § 5 of the 1933 Act, and does not
limit the scope or extraterritorial application of the antifraud or
other provisions of the federal securities laws."2 1 0

The release

goes on to say that "[iut is generally accepted that different
considerations apply to the extraterritorial application of the
antifraud provisions than to the registration provisions of the
[1933] Act."2 1 ' The SEC thereby distinguished the extraterritorial

scope of U.S. registration provisions (which it was willing to
delineate) from the extraterritorial scope of U.S. antifraud
provisions (which it was not willing to delineate). Regulation S

207.
208.
209.

See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, 147 F.3d at 125.
See SEC Brief, supranote 183, at 22-23.
See Release No. 6863, supranote 12, at 80,665.

210.

Id.

211.
Id. (citing Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252,
262-63 (2d Cir.), modified by 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S.Ct. 29
(1989); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (emphasis added)).
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was, in fact, an about-face from its traditional perceptions of the
scope of U.S. securities laws. Rather than further expand the
scope of U.S. securities laws, the SEC in Regulation S recognized
principles of comity 2 12 and thus adopted a territorial approach to
the registration requirements. 2 13 Behind Regulation S existed a
careful balance between the need for investor protection and the
need for an efficient system of international securities
2 14
regulation.
C. Problems with the Conduct and Effects Tests
There are two main problems with the conduct and effects
tests.
1. Questionable Justifications for the Tests
Both the conduct test and the effects test are problematic. In
applying the effects test, for example, courts have not defined
precisely which effects should be considered. 2 15 Many foreign
events, such as a fraud that causes the Tokyo stock exchange to
collapse, a war in the Persian Gulf, the merger of two large
Japanese automakers, 2 16 have substantial effects in the United
States. As the interconnectedness of the global market increases,
market events in one country are expected to have worldwide
repercussions. 2 17 For example on "Black Monday," October 19,
1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dove 22.6%; trading in
Tokyo that same day declined 14.7%, and the London market fell
12.2%.218 In a world of global markets, the failure of any major
securities firm in the United States, Japan, or any other
internationally active nation could have detrimental effects on

212.
See Release No. 6863, supra note 12, at 80,665 (defining "comity" as a
doctrine that "emphasizes restraint and tolerance by nations in international
affairs").
213.
See id. (stating that a "territorial approach acknowledges the primacy of
the laws in which a market is located").
214. See Testy, supranote 3, at 955 (discussing the need to reconcile equity
and efficiency).
215. See Fisch, supranote 5, at 561.
216. See id. at 562 nn. 218 & 219 (1993) (citing Diana B. Henriques, Global
Investing-A Special Report; In World Markets, Loose Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, July
23, 1991, at D1 (describing how the Japanese stock market scandal was blamed
for the drop in New York stock prices); Sylvia Nasar, The Economy Lives, But Will It
Ever Dance Again?, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1991, Section 3, at 8 ("Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait caused the biggest one-month plunge in American consumer
confidence that has appeared in the survey's history.")).
217.

See
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REGULATION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK, 11-7, 11-8 (1988).

218.

See CoxETAL., supranote 1, at 29.

OF MARKET

2000]

ZERO STEPS FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK

markets throughout the world. 2 19 Does the effects test require
more? Presumably, it does. Otherwise, the United States could
assert jurisdiction over any and every foreign transaction
impacting the United States.
The conduct test is also problematic. While the Second
Circuit requires substantial fraudulent activity in the United
States when foreigners seek the protection of U.S. securities laws,
other Circuits require less.2 20 To some courts, making phone
calls or sending mail to the United States is "conduct" within the
United States for jurisdictional purposes. 2 2 1 To others, a single
meeting in the United States between foreigners in a transaction
that is otherwise conducted offshore and involves no offer or sale
222
in U.S. markets, is sufficient "conduct."
While inconsistency among Circuits itself is problematic, one
should also question the reasoning behind the creation of the
conduct test. The purpose of the conduct test was to prevent the
223
United States from becoming a "base for fraudulent activity."
However, if there is no effect-and none is required under the
conduct test-in the United States, it makes little sense to utilize
U.S. enforcement powers.
In a global market, the more
appropriate tribunal to deal with the fraud is that of the country
2 25
in which the effects were felt. 22 4 Further, as one commentator
has suggested, suppose the country in which the effects were felt
does not consider the transaction fraudulent under its own laws.
Under such circumstances, there is little sense behind the
argument that the United States is being used as a "base for
2 26
fraudulent activity."
2. Problems with Case-by-Case Analysis
The lack of an inherent bright line in either the conduct or
effects test does have one advantage. It permits courts to account
for every relevant consideration and to tailor a "fair" result for the
particular situation. 22 7
In practice, however, case-by-case

219.
See James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission
in an InternationalizedMarketplace, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 577 (1992).
220.
See supranote 102 and accompanying text.
221.
See Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.) S.A.L., 547 F. Supp. 309, 315 (N.D.
Ill.
1982), affd, 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).
222.
See, e.g., Continental Grain (AustI.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.,
592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979).
223.
Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983).
224.
See Fisch, supranote 5, at 565-66.
225.
See id.
226.
Id.
227.
See Larry Kramer, Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law
After the InsuranceAntitrust Case: A Reply to ProfessorsLowenfeld and Trimble, 89
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analyses are questionable, particularly because such analyses
produce uncertainty through inconsistent holdings. Issuers and
investors are left wondering whether a particular transaction will
or will not be covered by U.S. law. Such uncertainty could
ultimately undermine business in the United States. To avoid the
228
risk of invoking the notoriously strict U.S. regulations,
229
foreigners may bar all U.S. access to beneficial transactions.
Additionally, it is doubtful that U.S. courts can perform a
truly fair analysis on a case-by-case basis. The conduct and
effects tests require courts to regulate foreign transactions
according to their own concepts of foreign policy. 2 30 The U.S.
courts' general approach to antifraud cases presumes that both
the United States and the foreign sovereign involved have a
common interest in providing a cause of action for allegations of
fraud. 2 3 1 As one commentator has mentioned, this overlooks the
fact that many nations have not chosen extensive regulation over
the system of caveat emptor.23 2 U.S. markets have become the
most heavily regulated in the world because Congress believed
such regulation was justified to promote investor protection and
2 33
economic stability and to promote a more efficient market.
While the U.S. securities laws arguably support U.S. policy, the
U.S. system is not the only system possible. 2 3
A foreign
sovereign may not concur with U.S. presumptions and policies. 2 35
Other countries have, in fact, objected
to and retaliated against
236
the broad application of U.S. law.
Thus, with every judicial decision, a court would need to
consider
among other things, (i) the effects on domestic markets and United
States investors of actions taken abroad by private parties and

Am. J. INT'L L. 750, 755 (1995) (noting that while case-by-case analysis is an
attractive concept, it is ultimately a "bad idea").
228. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supranote 34, at 689 (characterizing the
burdens of foreign securities regulation as "significantly less" than the burdens
imposed by U.S. securities laws).
229. See Fisch, supranote 5, at 524.
230. See id.
231.
See id. at 568.
232.
See id.
233.
See id.
234.
See id. at 568-69.
235.
See id. at 569 (stating that "[e]ven among countries that accept the
premise of extensive regulation of securities transactions, a variety of approaches
to regulation are possible").
236. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. This retaliation takes
the form of statutes designed to reverse the effect of a given U.S. statute,
legislation designed to protect transactions in the home country or discriminate
against U.S. business or business transactions, and rules aimed at preventing the
intrusion of the U.S. litigation process.
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foreign regulators; (ii) the international ramifications of the SEC's
actions; and (iii) how those international ramifications, in turn, will
feed back into or otherwise affect domestic markets and U.S.
237
investors.

With a multitude of policy considerations behind every decision, it
is appropriate that the legislative and executive branches be
involved in formulating this policy, rather than allowing it to
occur through ad hoc judicial decisionaking. The judiciary has
neither the ability nor the resources to assess the economic,
political, and social interests of a foreign sovereign. 2 38
Furthermore, while courts are ill-equipped to analyze the public
interests of the United States, they are even less equipped to
determine the interests of foreign governments and to balance
239
those interests against the interests of the United States.
Due to the unpredictability of decisions based on the conduct
and effects tests, some commentators have suggested that
Congress "look to its work in Regulation S"24 0 to improve these
tests.2 4 1 Instead, the Second Circuit in EOC looked to the
conduct and effects tests to clarify Regulation S. In so doing, the
Second Circuit undermined the purpose of Regulation S and
unraveled the delicate craftsmanship of the SEC.
In an area of law that requires certainty and predictability,
the conduct and effects tests offer little value. The language of
Regulation S, on the other hand, is clear. If a transaction is to
qualify for exemption from registration under Rule 901 of
Regulation S, both the offer and the sale must be made "outside
the United States."2 4 2 Offers and sales may certainly proceed
without registration based solely on Rule 901, but the transaction
must be deemed, on its face, to occur outside the United
States. 2 4

237. Doty, supranote 219, at 579.
238.
See Testy, supranote 3, at 958-59.
239.
See Fisch, supranote 5, at 566-67 n.243. "Aside from the fact that the
judiciary has little expertise... to evaluate the economic and social policies of a
foreign country ...
[iut is simply impossible to judicially 'balance' these totally
contradictory and mutually negating actions." Id. (citing In re Uranium Antitrust
Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979)).
240. Testy, supranote 3, at 958-59.

241.
242.
243.

See id.
Release No. 6863, supra note 12, at 80,662-80,663.
See Kaplan, supra note 120, at 2515.
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CONCLUSION

The exercise of jurisdiction over transnational securities
transactions involves significant foreign and domestic policy
concerns. Thus, it is appropriate that Congress, and not the
courts, determine the scope of U.S. laws. While the SEC provided
a well-delineated standard for determining the reach of U.S.
securities registration laws, unfortunately it left the courts to
decide the scope of U.S. antifraud provisions. The correct step for
Congress would be for it to fashion an "antifraud test" similar to
Regulation S's "registration test."
Because Regulation S resolves the complications of the
conduct and effects tests, it serves as an effective guide for
Congress to follow. First, Regulation S's clarity and predictability
potentially reduces the number of suits brought, effectively
decreasing the burden on our court system and therefore our
taxpayers. Second, courts basing their decisions on the text of
Regulation S are not faced with the impossible task of resolving
the overlapping legal, economic, and political concerns involved in
transnational securities litigation.
Finally, in drawing the
jurisdictional line at the territorial boundaries of the United
States, Regulation S recognizes the importance of comity and
cooperation in our more global world and respects the sovereignty
of other nations.
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